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This paper depicts American agricultural policy as stages in a stylized transition similar to the
demographic transition.  I describe four stages in the policy transition, but emphasis is on stages 3 and 4
which respectively feature phasing in and out of commodity price supports by government.  Before
describing American agricultural policy and the policy transition, I outline some characteristics of
American agriculture that make it unique among sectors, but that mostly are part of an earlier stage in the
agricultural transition.  The purpose of this paper is to glean lessons for other  countries from American
agricultural policy.
The Policy Transition
Agriculture progresses through a policy transition much as population progresses through the
demographic transition.  The four policy stages are as follows:
Policy Stages of agriculture and the economy Tax or subsidy for commodity programs
1.  Traditional Neither tax nor subsidy
2.  Developing Tax
3.  Maturing Subsidy
4.  Modern Neither tax nor subsidy
Precolonial America was a traditional society in stage 1 of the agricultural policy transition.  As
noted by T.W. Schultz (1964), a traditional society is in a local equilibrium of primitive technology and of
general poverty.  It is a hunter-gatherer or agricultural economy because the primitive technology forces a
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large part of society’s efforts to be devoted to meeting its most basic need—food.  Because such a society
is so heavily agricultural and poor, agricultural commodities cannot be subsidized or taxed.
The economic equilibrium of a traditional society, while only local, is not surprising.  Decades
and even centuries of adjustment to a relatively static technology enable such a society eventually to
combine resources so as to reach about as high a living standard as local technology and resources permit.
The local economic equilibrium is only partial, however, because new technology is available from other
countries and/or from local ingenuity by shifting a modest amount of the traditional society’s resources
from consumption to investment in technology transfer and development.
Stage 2 begins with the economic development process.  The process began with the colonial era
in the United States.  Some improved technology arrived from Europe, but colonial Americans farmed
much like the Egyptians farmed four millenia earlier—with animal draft power, unimproved seeds and
breeds, and primitive plows and harrows.  As the only sector of any size, agriculture had to provide the
tax base to fund education and technology development, transfer, and diffusion initiating and powering
the economic development process in stage 2.  Through the property tax, land, a relatively abundant
resource, was used to fund development of the human resource, a relatively scarce resource.  The process
of development was self-reinforcing as savings and investment created human, material, and
technological capital.  That capital in turn provided the economic base for more savings, investment, and
economic growth.  Agriculture provided food, fiber, and human capital for the nonfarm sector which
provided improved capital inputs to agriculture.
Development was speeded by mechanical innovations such as the cotton gin, grain reaper, and
steel plow and by the industrial revolution which began around 1850 in the United States.  The
development process was furthered by the Morrill Act of 1862 establishing the land-grant agricultural
college system of education, the Hatch Act of 1887 establishing a system of agricultural experiment
stations for research, and the Smith-Lever Act of 1914 establishing the agricultural extension service to
bring practical education and improved farming methods to nonresident students.3
Stage 3 begins when a nation’s nonfarm sector has developed to a level supplying much of its
national income.
1  It began in the 1920s in the United States.  For various reasons, agricultural progress in
stages 2 and 3 is likely to lag that of other sectors, and the United States was no exception.  In the U.S.,
the “farm problem” arose from more rapid technological change in agriculture than elsewhere.  Rapid
labor-saving technological change coupled with an inelastic and slowly increasing output demand and
sluggish farm labor adjustments created a surplus of agricultural operator and family labor earning low
returns on resources.
In East Asia, the farm problem had opposite origins—high man-land ratios coupled with more
rapid growth in capital and productivity of the nonfarm than of the farm economy.  That rapid nonfarm
productivity growth efficiently supplied exports, earning foreign exchange that raised the value of local
currency in international markets.  Coupled with lagging productivity gains in local agriculture, the result
was falling terms of trade for agriculture.  Agricultural exports were expensive to consumers abroad while
cheap food imports from abroad competed successfully for domestic food markets.  The result was an
East Asia Disease manifest in chronic low income and redundant labor in agriculture as farm families
adjusted slowly to emerging economic disequilibrium in stage 3 of the policy transition.  While earnings
of farm people lagged behind those of nonfarm people per capita in stages 2 and 3, the distinguishing
characteristic of stage 3 was nonfarm wealth sufficient to transfer wealth to agriculture through
government in the United States and East Asia.
Stage 4 begins when agriculture in a developed country has worked off much of its redundant
resources and approaches long-term economic equilibrium (it never reaches that equilibrium).  That time
arrived in the United States around 1970, but the transition was obscured by oil embargoes and inflation
of the 1970s followed by the farm financial crisis induced by agricultural over-expansion in the 1970s and
Reaganomics (large federal budget deficits and attendant high real interest and exchange rates) of the
early 1980s.  Stage 4 clearly had arrived by the late 1980s, however, and commodity programs no longer
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could be justified on economic equity or efficiency grounds.  American farm and nonfarm sectors had
become affluent.  Each had become capable of relying primarily on markets without transfers.  However,
government properly continued to provide public goods, correct externalities, and provide a safety net.
In the next section, I pick up American agriculture at stage 3.  The nation is wealthy enough to
subsidize agriculture if a case can be made.  Salient characteristics of American agriculture in the 1920s
and 1930s are described before I present a brief history of U.S. commodity programs.
Characteristics of U.S. Agriculture
  As noted above, stage 1 for American agricultural policy extended to the colonial era.  Stage 2
began with the colonial era, accelerated with the industrial revolution starting about 1850, and ended
about 1920.  Of interest for commodity programs is the background for agricultural policy in the 1920s
when policy stage 3 began.
Several characteristics of U.S. agriculture, while not unique to America, were used to justify
interventions transferring income in stage 3 from consumers and taxpayers to farmers:
1.  Agriculture is subject to biological processes dependent on the vagaries of weather and pests.
The long biological lead time between production plans and output intensify instability and associated
uncertainty problems for farmers.
2.  Agricultural production comes from millions of family farms recognized to be efficient units
of crop and livestock production.  No one producer can influence price—each producer is a price taker
facing a perfectly elastic demand at the farm level.
3.  People operating family farms have unique moral attributes prized by society and judged by
many to be worth subsidizing to preserve.
4.  Aggregate demand and supply for farm commodities are price inelastic in the short run to
intermediate run.  Hence, small changes in either supply (due to weather, technology, pests, price
expectations, etc.) or demand (due to national economic conditions, export markets, etc.) produce sizable
changes in price that can cause extended hardship to farmers if prices fall and to consumers if prices rise.5
The inelastic demand implies that consumers place great value in having enough food, but little value in
having more.
5.  Productivity advance is unusually rapid for agriculture.  A steady stream of improved capital
inputs (technology) comes from innovative science and industry.  Farmers find many of these inputs
profitable and adopt them to cut unit costs by saving labor or raising output.  Crop and livestock supply
advancing rapidly against an inelastic demand reduces not only real farm prices, but also gross and net
farm income.  Hence, labor resources must exit agriculture as productivity advances.
6.  Supply response is slow in part because resources are specialized to agriculture.  Farmers
cannot maintain income by converting their resources to profitable nonfarm use when farm prices fall.
The argument for asset fixity has largely focused on capital assets such as machinery and land, but it
applies more realistically, if at all, to operator and family labor.  High birth rates in agriculture exacerbate
the excess labor problem.
7.  The income elasticity of demand for farm output is very low, hence economic growth raises
demand for farm products more slowly than demand for other products.  This compounds the excess
product supply and labor problems.
8.  Buildup of labor-saving capital inputs raises capital requirements and land prices, creating
cash flow problems for the family farm refinanced each generation.  Debt service demands force high
savings rates on farmers.  This reduces living standards, but fuels capital gain accumulation as farmers
“live poor and die rich.”  Because they “live poor,” they generate considerable demand, even by
commercial farmers earning favorable economic returns, for income transfers from the government
(taxpayers).
9.  American agriculture is a net exporter.  As such, given the elastic export demand, the nation is
inclined to let markets set export prices.  Maintaining prices above free market levels in the domestic
sector brings charges by foreign competitors that the U.S. is dumping products in export markets.
Production controls and high overall price supports cause loss of much needed export markets.
Alternatives to market intervention such as direct payments to farmers leaves their economic livelihood6
vulnerable to political whims of Congress.  Hence, except for sugar and a few other commodities,
American agriculture lacks the advantage of concealing farm subsidies in inflated consumer prices using
import tariffs or a “single desk” monopsony buyer as used in some food net importing countries.
10.  Agriculture in America is viewed by populists as exploited by agribusiness (input supply and
product marketing firms) at home and by predatory foreign businesses and governments abroad.  It is said
that American farmers can compete with foreign producers, but they cannot compete with state (foreign
government) trading monopolies or export subsidies provided by foreign governments.
In the 1920s, the above considerations constituted a view of agriculture best described as chronic
economic disequilibrium.  Interventions in agricultural markets was justified, it was held, because
agriculture was persistently characterized by low and falling prices, low incomes, low rates of return on
investment, high financial failure rates, excess labor, and instability that private risk management
strategies and tools could not avoid or protect against.  In short, conventional wisdom held that
agricultural markets did not work or caused too much adjustment pain.
Brief History of U.S. Commodity Programs
With the U.S. wealthy enough and the nonfarm sector large enough to subsidize agriculture, the
above characteristics provided a rationale for intervention in markets in stage 3 of the policy transition.
Programs for cotton and grains are described first.  Attention then turns to dairy, peanuts, sugar, and
tobacco.  I have drawn on Farm Policy Analysis (Tweeten 1989) for considerable portions of the
following history of commodity programs.
Grains and Cotton
Historically, grains and cotton have been the most extensive and costly U.S. farm commodity
support programs.  Federal involvement began with the Federal Farm Board in 1929.  With modest
funding, the Board attempted to raise farm income by assisting farm supply and marketing cooperatives
and by purchasing stocks of wheat, cotton, and other commodities.  The Board arose out of a perennial
misconception that low farm prices and incomes were from exploitation by “middlemen”—agribusinesses7
selling inputs to farmers and marketing farm output.  The cause instead was excess supply of output
(resources) relative to demand in the 1920s caused by expansion of U.S. agriculture during World War I
and subsequent recovery of European agriculture in the post-war years.
The American agricultural economy deteriorated further with domestic and export demand falling
with the Great Depression.  Farm income per capita dropped to as little as one-third that of nonfarmers;
up to three-fourths of the farm population was classified as poor.  The federal governments’ response was
the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, the grandfather of today’s commodity support programs.  The
Act featured voluntary programs of (1) nonrecourse loan price supports, (2) government financed buffer
stock accumulation, and (3) paid cropland diversion to control commodity supply.
Under the nonrecourse loan, the producer pledged his recently harvested crop as security for a
federal loan at a specified loan rate (crop support price) from the government.  If the market price rose
above the loan rate, the producer could repay the government loan and sell the commodity to the highest
private bidder.  If the market price did not rise above the loan rate, the farmer could turn in the
commodity to the government—the government having no recourse (hence the term “nonrecourse”) but
to accept the commodity as full repayment of the loan.  Participation by producers was high so the loan
rate tended to set a floor price under the commodity.
Although the 1933 Act was declared unconstitutional because it taxed agribusinesses to finance it,
the basic features of the legislation were redrafted into other legislation that continued to 1996.  For food
grains and cotton, programs for decades were mandatory for all producers of a commodity if a specified
majority (usually two-thirds) approved of supply control and support prices in a national referendum.
Producers regularly voted approval.  After approval, all producers were required to stay within their
acreage allotment or base to qualify for nonrecourse loans.  The acreage allotment was based on each
producer’s acreage in a historic period.
Over time, key controversies for grains and cotton were how high and on what criterion to
support prices, how to control production, whether supports should be flexible or fixed, whether programs
should be voluntary or mandatory, whether to restrict acreage or output sales, whether the purpose was to8
preserve family farms or stabilize prices, and whether to rely on production controls and price supports or
direct payments.
After tying price supports to the inverse extent of surpluses in the late 1930s, the government set
high rigid price supports made feasible by strong demand during World War II.  After the war, the high
support prices contained political momentum difficult to reverse although they generated surpluses.  After
surpluses mounted after the Korean War ended in 1953.  The Agricultural Trade Development and
Assistance Act, Public Law 480, was approved in 1954.  This Food for Peace Act provided substantial
financial assistance for export disposal of American farm surpluses to foreign countries.  The Agricultural
Act of 1954 established lower and flexible supports for basic commodities.  Thus, flexible price supports
finally arrived after repeated postponements following World War II.
Dumping of surpluses on international markets (PL 480) and continuing stock accumulation were
unable alone to cope with excess production capacity, so in 1956 surpluses were addressed with long-term
idling of acreage.  The Conservation Reserve Programs (CRP) of general cropland retirement under long-
term contracts as opposed to one-year specific crop retirement was launched in 1956 (and again in 1985).
Instead of specifying how many acres of a grain or cotton a farmer could produce or instead of diverting a
portion of (say) the corn base to soil conserving uses on an annual basis, the Conservation Reserve
Programs paid the producer to divert a specified number of acres of erosion-prone cropland to soil
conserving uses for (usually) a 10-year period; the producer could plant remaining land to other crops of
his choosing.
The 1956 CRP eventually included a maximum of 30 million mostly low productivity acres.
Given high price supports, CRP along with foreign food assistance programs (Public Law 480) were
unable to reduce surpluses.  Consequently, corn farmers were given the option of (1) high prices and
acreage allotments or (2) low supports and no acreage controls in a 1958 referendum.  They chose high
supports and allotments.  But the government remained unable to lower production of wheat or corn
enough to avoid burdensome, costly surpluses of stocks in storage.9
When John Kennedy became President in 1960, the Administration concluded that farmers must
have income support, but that voluntary programs paying farmers to reduce production were too costly to
taxpayers.  Under voluntary programs, the government had tried to reduce costs by tying supports to the
costs of production or past real prices (parity).  Because none of those efforts was successful in reducing
Treasury costs, the Administration attempted to extend mandatory programs.  If two-thirds of the
producers of a commodity agreed to a mandatory program in national referendum, then all producers must
cut production (for no government payment) to force up the market price.  That attempt to extend to all
grains and cotton the mandatory program previously used in cotton and wheat was turned back by
Congress in 1962 and by wheat growers in 1963.  Thus, except for rice and some minor commodities
such as tobacco, support programs were made voluntary after 1963.  Rejection of mandatory programs
recognized the reality that major American crops had to be competitive in elastic world export markets
and that high, rigid price supports would lose those markets.  And to achieve a given net farm income,
taxpayers were more willing to tolerate high Treasury costs than producers were willing to accept
mandatory production controls.
Despite major commodity program interventions and Treasury outlays, family farms continued to
be lost at a rapid rate.  The cause was believed to be too many payments going to large farms, so
Congress imposed payment limitations on individual producers in the Agricultural Act of 1970.  That Act
also established the “set aside” program of short-term land retirement.  That is, instead of restricting
acreage of specific crops, the government required the producer to divert some proportion of his historic
cropland base to soil conserving uses; he could plant whatever he chose on remaining acres.  The purpose
was to reduce the real economic cost of programs and please producers by giving them more cropping
flexibility to respond to markets.
Also to reduce real economic costs of programs and preserve more markets, direct payments were
introduced.  The Wheat-Cotton Act of 1964 augmented the loan support rate for wheat by providing a
certificate program paying 75 cents per bushel to producers from a tax on processors.  This certificate
allowed the market price to be lower while maintaining farm income and global competitiveness.  The10
subsequent Agricultural Act of 1970 also provided a certificate on a prescribed number of bushels times
the difference between the wheat parity price (1910–14 ratio of wheat price to input prices updated to
current year) and the market price received by farmers in the first five months of the marketing year.
Direct payments assumed greater prominence in the Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of
1973 which established target prices and deficiency payments.  Deficiency payments were direct transfers
from the government to farmers equal to the shortfall of the loan rate (or market price, if higher) below
the target price, multiplied by “normal” or program production.  Target price levels under various
legislation were set at some times according to parity or cost of production, and at other times by
government mandate.
The Agricultural and Food Act of 1981 was the high-water mark of commodity programs.  Target
prices were set by Congress at high levels.  Because deficiency payments could be increased by “proving”
higher yields (producing actual market receipts) and because farmers believed based on past action that
the government periodically used historic acreage to update program acreage used with target prices to
set deficiency payments, producers viewed the target price much as a supply price. Thus, a high target
price induced more production to obtain higher deficiency payments.  High support prices, coupled with
the collapse of export markets artificially swelled by petrodollars and debt financing of third-world
countries in the 1970s, raised program costs and government commodity stocks to unacceptable levels.  In
1983, severe drought coupled with a massive short-term acreage diversion program reduced grain
supplies to levels compromising the nation’s ability to export.  Market share was lost to competing
exporters.
Consequently, loan rates and target prices were reduced in the Food Security Act of 1985.
Program yields and program acreage used to calculate deficiency payments were essentially fixed,
decoupling payments from current production and, hence, ending the role of target price as a supply price.
Marketing loans were introduced for cotton and rice featuring payments to farmers rather than
government stock accumulation when the market price fell below the loan support rate.  Along with a new
Conservation Reserve Program converting up to 36 million crop acres to soil conserving uses, these11
programs constituted a major attempt to address environment problems.  A Conservation Compliance
program required farmers participating in commodity programs to use sound conservation practices, a
Sodbuster program discourage adding to the cropland base, and a Swampbuster program discouraged
drainage and cropping of wetlands.
The Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990 continued reductions in real loan
rates, target prices, and deficiency payments.  Other provisions provided for greater flexibility in acreage
among crops.  The trend was to greater market orientation and international competitiveness.  In real
terms (adjusted for inflation with the GDP deflator), loan rates under the 1985 and 1990 farm bills had
been reduced 52 percent from 1983 levels by 1995 for corn and wheat.  Target prices for corn and wheat
had been reduced 36 percent under the 1985 and 1990 Acts, but the real reduction was greater because
direct deficiency payments tied to target prices were allowed on fewer acres.
Although the phase down of commodity programs including the phase out of honey, wool, and
mohair programs began before the 1996 farm bill, the Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform
(FAIR) Act of 1996 represented a radical departure from previous commodity programs.  It immediately
ended supply control (acreage reduction programs), target prices, and stock accumulation by government.
Transition payments (production flexibility contract payments) followed a rigid, preset pattern beginning
with $5.6 billion in 1996 and phasing down to $4.0 billion in 2002.  These payments, prorated to
producers based on historic production on individual farms, were decoupled from current or future
production and prices.  Transition payments presumably will end after year 2002.
Several public provisions from previous legislation were retained including loan rates, crop
insurance, an emergency grain reserve, information systems, environmental programs, and agricultural
research and extension.  Crop loan rates were continued at their low 1995 levels.  The marketing loan
concept used under the 1985 Act for cotton and rice was broadened to other supported crops, replacing
the nonrecourse loan and ending government stock accumulation.
At issue is what lies ahead for grains and cotton programs after year 2002.  Government supply
control, stock accumulation, and the Export Enhancement (export subsidy) Program are unlikely to12
continue (Tweeten and Zulauf 1997).  The best guess is that a safety net of minimal marketing loan
supports, an emergency grain reserve, and yield or revenue insurance will be retained.  Public “goods”
including government support of environmental programs, basic research, and information systems also
will be continued.
A problem is that Conservation Compliance and Sodbuster features in operation since the 1985
bill designed to induce farmers to use “best management practices” and discouraging conversion of land
to cropland and conserving soil in return for commodity program benefits will become inoperative if
farmers no longer have transition payments to induce program participation.  Thus, transition payments
are likely to be relabeled “green” payments and initially continued in the name of preserving
Conservation Compliance, but without retargeting of payments among recipients.  Over time, however,
green payments will be retargeted among farms to induce soil conservation and water quality control.
The Conservation Reserve Program of general land retirement will continue to pay farmers to convert
land to uses that conserve soil and protect water quality.  Other programs for the environment also will be
continued, but large livestock operators will be regulated by the Environmental Protection Agency and
nonpoint (field) pollution from farm fertilizers and pesticides will be regulated by the Clean Water Act.
Mandatory regulations under these livestock and water quality regulations contrast with the traditional
agricultural industry practice of being paid by the U.S. Department of Agriculture for voluntary measures
to protect the environment.
Dairy
The dairy support program is built around Federal Milk Marketing Orders (FMMOs) established
under authority of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937.  Orders in an area are instituted
upon approval of two-thirds of milk producers in that area.  Section 602 of the 1937 Act states that the
purpose of marketing orders is
…to establish and maintain such orderly marketing conditions…as will provide in the
interests of producers and consumers, an orderly flow of supply thereof to market…to
avoid unreasonable fluctuations in supplies and prices.13
In each milk marketing order, prices are established each month for classes of milk by end use
demand.  The Class I (milk for beverage consumption) price is set at the Minnesota-Wisconsin market
price plus the transportation premium from that region to the order area.  Prices for manufactured uses
such as cheese and butter are based mainly on local supply and demand.  Producers are paid a blend price
of the various classes of milk consumption.  Thus, price discrimination with a higher price in the inelastic
fluid (Class I) market blended with a lower price in the less inelastic manufactured markets raised revenue
to producers.  Under the Agricultural Act of 1949, the federal government assumed responsibility for
removing surpluses generated by the blend price and that would not clear markets at a support price set by
government.
In the 1990s, the order system began to unravel.  The states of Minnesota and Wisconsin (M–W)
presumably with a comparative advantage in dairy concluded that they were losing income because the
higher blend prices in other regions (because the Class I prices rises with distance from M–W)
encouraged production and milk processing elsewhere.  That price advantage coupled with growing
efficiency in milk production in the Southwest region caused M–W to lose market share.  Studies
indicated the M–W milk price would rise from terminating the FMMO system.  The disarray among dairy
regions evident in Congress enabled lawmakers to orient dairy programs more to markets.
The 1996 farm bill established a very low marketing loan type of price support to be defended by
payments rather than the historic practice of government purchasing surpluses from markets.  Because an
upward sloping supply curve coupled with downward sloping demand curves for milk in various uses
inherently generates surpluses when producers are paid the blend price without supply control under
FMMOs, the exit of governments from its market clearing role was a severe blow to the FMMO system.
In addition, in 1994, a federal judge ruled against classified pricing, a ruling not yet imposed and being
appealed.
These unsettling elements prompted dairy producers to make changes designed to promote
bargaining power and stabilize prices and incomes.  One response was to form regional associations such
as the Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact featuring administered rather than market determined prices.  A14
second response was to consolidate some of the 250 producer dairy cooperatives that control 80 percent
of the milk supply into fewer numbers to exercise more control over market prices.  FMMOs also are
being consolidated.
At issue is what will happen to the dairy industry in the future.  The federal government has been
supportive of Compacts and cooperatives.  However, the federal government is unlikely to grant these
groups the supply controls and market powers essential to exercise much bargaining advantage.  A
cooperative or Compact charging high prices is likely to have its market eroded by suppliers outside the
system charging lower prices.
Most small, inefficient dairy farms have already exited the industry.  Remaining producers on
average have more wealth than the average taxpayer or milk consumer, hence, transfers to milk producers
cannot be justified on equity grounds.  The development of technologies such as reconstituted, sterile,
ultra-high-temperature, and irradiated milk increase the feasibility of storing and transporting milk at
relatively low cost.  Relying on markets alone, such innovations can ensure a safe, plentiful supply of
milk year round for every region.  Futures and options markets as well as other risk management tools can
address price instability problems.  The market for milk like other farm commodities is rival,
exclusionary, and transparent, hence the commodity is most efficiently allocated by markets.  In short,
with the rationale and public will for dairy market interventions eroding, the trend will be away from
central planning and towards market pricing and output in the dairy industry.
Peanut, Sugar, and Tobacco Programs
The peanut program currently features a two price plan with quota peanuts used in domestic
foods receiving a high price and over-quota peanuts receiving essentially the world price so they can
compete in export markets.  The sugar program utilizes quotas and import duties to protect domestic
markets from cheap foreign imports.  The tobacco program features high price supports and market
quotas at no net cost to government.
Current peanut, tobacco, and sugar programs have several characteristics in common:
•   They derive subsidies from consumers rather than from taxpayers.15
•   The U.S. is only marginally competitive in global markets for these commodities.
•   At least two of the commodities, tobacco and sugar, exhibit negative externalities warranting a
Pigouvian tax equal to the shortfall of the private cost below the social cost.  That the social cost of
smoking is high is well known.  Social cost of sugar consumption also exceeds private costs because the
“empty” calories of sugar (along with fat, some from peanuts) are used excessively.  One-third of
American are obese (more than 20 percent over recommended weight) and diseases such as atheroscerosis
associated with chronic excess calorie consumption are a factor in approximately half of all deaths.
While a case can be made for a Pigouvian tax holding tobacco and sugar prices above free market
levels, no economic rationale justifies paying proceeds of that Pigouvian tax to producers.  Rather, the tax
could be dedicated to health care.
Deadweight loss in national income (ignoring externalities) has been estimated to be
approximately 10 percent of farm receipts for tobacco and sugar, but only about 1 percent for peanuts
(average of two estimates shown in Tweeten 1989, p. 366).  These estimates ignore social costs, however.
If such costs were accounted for, the deadweight cost of these three programs would be low.
The programs cannot be justified on equity grounds because they “tax” consumers of lesser
wealth to subsidize producers of greater wealth.  For this reason and because these programs are
inconsistent with the trend to open markets, Congressional efforts are mounting to phase out the
programs.
Conclusions and Implications
The lessons of American commodity programs are not universal, but need to be carefully studied
by governments that would intervene in (or exit from) farm markets.
1.  Commodity programs display much momentum.  They continue long after their initial
justification has vanished because the relatively few recipients of benefits are aware they will suffer large
losses and can justify organizing effectively to preserve their gains through political action.  Meanwhile,16
those who gain from phaseout of programs often are numerous and widely dispersed, unaware that they
will gain, and are unorganized and apathetic.  Although aggregate benefits may greatly exceed costs of
phasing out supports, each of the gainers receives too little and too vague a benefit to motivate active
support of change in Congress.  Thus, stage 3 in the United States will continue to year 2002 and perhaps
beyond although agriculture shifted from a long-term disequilibrium economy to an equilibrium economy
before 1990 (Tweeten 1989; Gardner 1992; Tweeten and Zulauf 1997).  The lesson is that those who
observe a bona fide market failure suitable for correction by government intervention must recognize that
“corrective” government programs and the distortions they introduce are likely to persist long after the
market failure has vanished.
2.  Another law of public programs is that program benefits often accrue disproportionately to the
least poor and disadvantaged among those eligible for benefits.  Much rhetoric had been devoted to
saving family farms which continued to be lost throughout the commodity program era of stage 3.
Commodity support prices tied to production provided larger farmers with much greater economic
benefits than small farmers.  Program benefits provided economic security and capital enabling operators
to leverage equity to buy out their neighbors and realize economies of size.  Empirical studies (see
Tweeten 1993) give evidence that programs did not preserve family farms except in the short run when
commodity programs and generous government credit subsidies saved many family farms that otherwise
would have failed as in the financial crisis of the 1981–1986 period.
The public would like to see commodity programs redesigned to preserve family farms.
Redesign of programs could have saved family farms and markedly slowed if not reversed the relentless
movement to a dual agriculture made up of a few large farms accounting for most farm output and a large
number of small farms accounting for most farms.  The policy solution would have been to rely on direct
payments for support of agriculture.  Saving small family farms means giving up supply management
coupled with reliance solely on carefully targeted direct payments to support income of small farms.
That reform never occurred for several reasons.  One is that although small farms dominated farm
numbers, they never dominated the politics of agriculture.  Commercial farms used data for low-income17
small farms to butress the need for commodity programs, but made sure payment limitations and other
rules were written so that the relatively few commercial farms continued to receive most of the monetary
benefits of programs.
Commodity program reform also has been thwarted by diffuse goals.  One goal was to support
and stabilize farm income and prices by cutting output.  Opponents of payment limitations argued that
commercial farmers needed to be included in acreage diversion programs because they accounted for
most production.
Although Americans in vast majority say they want to preserve family farms, they are unwilling
to pay much to preserve them.  One reason is that Americans may not very highly value preserving family
farms.  Another reason is that most Americans recognize the political infeasibility of designing and
implementing programs that do in fact save family farms.
3.  Farm commodities are market goods (rival, exclusionary, and transparent) rather than public
goods, hence are allocated more efficiently by markets than by governments.  The farm and food
economy requires millions of decisions each day to operate efficiently; central planning from American
dairy markets to Soviet Union collective farms has proven incapable of making such decisions wisely
over the long run.  Despite the advantages of relying on markets for farm commodities, many people
continue to make a case for government supports.  One justification for farm programs is the continuing
apparent low current return on aggregate farm assets averaging of about 4 percent annually.  Tweeten
(1979) advanced the decreasing cost theory and the cash flow theory of farm problems to explain why
farm resource returns appear to be low even when they are not.
Another frequently invoked justification for government commodity programs is to cushion the
impact of the very real instability and uncertainty endemic to agriculture.  A case can be made that the
private discount rate is greater than the social discount rate and that hence the private sector underinvests
in buffer stocks and other risk management tools.  On the other hand, a case can be made that
mismanagement of public buffer stocks and insurance programs has been too pervasive and wasteful to
warrant continuation of the programs.18
Of course, externalities warrant a continued public role but in farm inputs rather than
commodities.  The public role in environmental programs, basic research, infrastructure, and information
systems will continue into stage 4 of farm policy.
4.  Markets for agricultural commodities are difficult to circumvent.  Benefits of higher supports
are rather quickly passed to landowners as farm operators bid-up land rents and land prices.  Benefits are
lost by renters, new landowners, and farm laborers.  For some time, I have been calculating rates of return
on farms by size.  I find that commercial farmers tend to earn returns comparable to those elsewhere
within approximately five years after either a positive or negative shift in earnings.  The ability of farmers
to adjust to risk and uncertainty often is underestimated.  Some economists have developed neat
theoretical rationalizations for commodity programs.  The most effective refutation of these elegant
theories is the simple fact that commercial farmers who account for most output have been doing well
economically and the market is performing very much like neoclassical economics predicts (see Gardner
1992; Tweeten 1989, Ch. 4).  Commodity programs in the United States have lost their intellectual base;
they cannot be justified on grounds of economic equity or efficiency.  Many of the 10 characteristics of
American agriculture in policy stage 3 continue to hold, but do not preclude timely adjustments to
emerging economic realities.
5.  Major farm commodities losing comparative advantage are likely to most seek and find
protection from market competition.  Deadweight costs are one measure of protection and inability to
compete in international markets.  Measured by deadweight (national income loss) cost as a percent of
receipts, the social costs of commodity programs have been highest for sugar, rice, cotton, and wheat; are
less for feed grains and dairy; and are least for soybeans, livestock, and poultry (see Tweeten 1989, p.
366).  Many of the established commodities most threatened by foreign competition are in the Southern
region of the U.S.; it is perhaps no coincidence that Southern members of Congress are most active and
effective in maintaining programs.
6.  Multilateral trade reform has not been a very effective means to liberalize farm policies.  It is
notable that the major American (1985 and 1990 farm bills) and European Union (McSharry) reforms19
came before rather than with completion of the Uruguay Round bargaining.  Reforms were made
unilaterally because the major social costs of commodity programs are borne by the country practicing
them.  Multilateral trade agreements are helpful, but initiatives for freer trade often originate at the
national level for national benefit.
7.  American farm policy has been heavily influenced by the populist belief that better marketing
can resolve problems of the farm economy.  One of the most persuasive populist myths is that
agribusiness exploits American farmers, robbing them of rightful profits.  Accordingly, farmers have
called for and government has granted numerous means to market at lower cost and without exploitation
by agribusinesses.  Thousands of cooperatives and numerous marketing initiatives including the Federal
Farm Board of 1929 were formed to save the family farm and raise rates of return on farm resources.
Farm resources now adjust fairly rapidly to equalize returns among sectors, providing parity resource
returns with or without a competitive agribusiness marketing sector.  With the farm sector now close to
long-term economic equilibrium, rates of return on farm resources are set by rates of return elsewhere,
and the number of farms is based mainly on technology.  Thus, technology and resource markets rather
than product markets largely determine the structure and economic destiny of agriculture.
8.  Commodity programs often have been defended on economic efficiency grounds of providing
forward prices of benefit in allocating farm resources, of reducing instability so that farmers can adapt
improved technology with greater security, and of retaining efficient farmers in hard times so they can
produce commodities when needed.  Most of these arguments do not stand scrutiny.  The best case for
farm programs in the 1950s and 1960s was that they bought time for the millions of redundant workers in
farming to adjust more painlessly to retirement, an off-farm job, or an efficient farming operation.  This
mostly is an equity rather than an efficiency argument, and one that was lost once agriculture had moved
to stage 4.  Given that agriculture is now earning equilibrium returns with the nonfarm sector, but is a
small part of the economy, it follows the agriculture has a stake in sound policies that promote national
economic growth.  Such growth raises income of farmers and nonfarmers alike because resource markets20
and returns are integrated and in the long term are mostly independent of what happens in agricultural
product markets.
9.  Economic analysis matters.  Various analysts attribute the major reforms in the 1996 U.S. farm
bill to Republican control of the Congress, budget pressures, a skillful chairman of the U.S. House
agriculture committee, and to other tactical sources (Browne et al. 1997; Orden et al. 1996).  That is like
attributing World War I to the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand at Sarejevo.  A more plausible
explanation is that Congress realized from widely circulated economic analysis that the intellectual
paradigm (arrival of stage 4) no longer justified continuation of commodity supports.  Legislators cleverly
sought and found tactics to implement the new agricultural paradigm in the face of intense pressures by
special interests to continue past transfers to producers.  The shift in public policy towards direct payment
supports and gradually phasing those down while emphasizing environmental, basic research, information
system, and infrastructure support has generally been consistent with economic principles although the
path often has been twisted and treacherous.
10.  Shifts in the paradigm of policy stages often take time to show up in legislation.  That is
because special events often are the precipitating factor behind changes in policy.  In the 1930s it was the
Great Depression that brought the first major farm policy intervention, in the 1940s World War II brought
high rigid price supports, in the 1950s massive surpluses brought flexible price supports, in the 1960s a
hard-fought wheat referendum brought voluntary rather than mandatory programs, in the 1970s the
recognized need to compete internationally brought direct payments versus high price supports, in the
1980s high treasury costs and an overvalued dollar losing export markets forced lower supports and
greater flexibility in programs, and farm prosperity of the 1990s finally convinced many disbelievers that
farmers could earn “fair” returns in markets without commodity programs.
In conclusion, American farm programs after year 2002 are likely to be more market oriented.  A
4 million metric ton emergency grain reserve will provide perceived food security for American
consumers (real security lies in exporting less, importing more, slaughtering livestock, private stocks,
etc.), but more assurance for developing country consumers.  Producers will be provided with some21
security against instability through modest price supports and crop yield or revenue insurance.  Transition
payments will be converted to “green” payments and eventually better targeted to encourage conservation
compliance for soil erosion control and water quality.  The Conservation Reserve Program will continue
to pay for holding fragile cropland in soil conserving uses and converting land along streams to filter
strips.  Public “goods” programs for agricultural research, extension, information systems, grades,
standards, and regulations will continue.  The major departure from the past will be an end to supply
control, stock accumulation, export subsidy, and coupled direct payment programs.
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